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Abstract
I explore the possibility that the laws of physics might be laws of
inference rather than laws of nature. What sort of dynamics can one derive
from well-established rules of inference? Specifically, I ask: Given relevant
information codified in the initial and the final states, what trajectory is
the system expected to follow? The answer follows from a principle of
inference, the principle of maximum entropy, and not from a principle of
physics. The entropic dynamics derived this way exhibits some remarkable
formal similarities with other generally covariant theories such as general
relativity.
1 Introduction
The study of changes in the natural world, dynamics, is divided among several
distinct disciplines. Thermodynamics, for example, considers changes between
special states, the so-called states of equilibrium, and addresses the question of
which final states can be reached from any given initial state. Mechanics studies
the changes we call motion, chemistry deals with chemical reactions, quantum
mechanics with transitions between quantum states, and the list goes on.
In all of these examples we want to predict or explain the observed changes
on the basis of information that is codified in a variety of ways into what we
call the states. In some cases the final state can be predicted with certainty, in
others the information available is incomplete and we can, at best, only assign
probabilities.
The theory of thermodynamics holds a very special place among all these
forms of dynamics. With the development of statistical mechanics by Maxwell,
Boltzmann, Gibbs and others, and eventually culminating in the work of Jaynes
[1], thermodynamics became the first clear example of a fundamental physical
theory that could be derived from general principles of probable inference. The
entire theory follows from a clear idea of the subject matter, that is, an appro-
priate choice of which states one is talking about, plus well-known principles of
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inference [2], namely, consistency, objectivity, universality and honesty. These
principles are sufficiently constraining that they lead to a unique set of rules
for processing information: these are the rules of probability theory [3] and the
method of maximum entropy [1][4].
There are strong indications that a second example of a dynamics that can
be deduced from principles of inference is afforded by quantum mechanics [5].
Many features of the theory, traditionally considered as postulates, follow from
the correct identification of the subject matter plus general principles of infer-
ence. Briefly, the goal of quantum mechanics is not to predict the behavior of
microscopic particles, but rather to predict the outcomes of experiments per-
formed with certain idealized setups. Thus, the subject of quantum theory is
not just the particles, but rather the experimental setups. The variables that
encode the information relevant for prediction are the amplitudes or wave func-
tions assigned to the setups. These ingredients plus a requirement of consistency
(namely, that if there are two ways to compute an amplitude, the two results
should agree) supplemented by entropic arguments are sufficient to derive most
of the standard formalism including Hilbert spaces, a time evolution that is
linear and unitary, and the Born probability rule.
If quantum mechanics, deemed by many to be the fundamental theory, can
be derived in this way, then it is possible, perhaps even likely, that other forms of
dynamics might ultimately reflect laws of inference rather than laws of nature.
Should this turn out to be the case, then the fundamental equations of change,
or motion, or evolution as the case might be, would follow from probabilistic and
entropic arguments and the discovery of new dynamical laws would be reduced
to the discovery of what is the necessary information for carrying out correct
inferences. Unfortunately, this search for the right variables has always been
and remains to this day the major stumbling block in the understanding of new
phenomena.
The purpose of this paper is to explore this possible connection between the
fundamental laws of physics and the theory of probable inference: Can dynamics
be derived from inference? Rather than starting with a known dynamical theory
and attempting to derive it, I proceed in the opposite direction and ask: What
sort of dynamics can one derive from well-established rules of inference?
In section 2 I establish the notation, define the space of states, and briefly
review how the introduction of a natural quantitative measure of the change
involved in going from one state to another turns the space of states into a metric
space [6]. (Such metric structures have been found useful in statistical inference,
where the subject is known as Information Geometry [7], and in physics, to study
both equilibrium [8] and nonequilibrium thermodynamics [9].)
Typically, once the kinematics appropriate to a certain motion has been
selected, one proceeds to define the dynamics by additional postulates. This is
precisely the option I want to avoid: in the dynamics developed here there are
no such postulates. The equations of motion follow from an assumption about
what information is relevant and sufficient to predict the motion.
In a previous paper [6] I tackled a similar problem. There I answered the
question:
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Q1: Given the initial state and that the system evolves to other states, what
trajectory is the system expected to follow?
This question implicitly assumes that there is a trajectory and that information
about the initial state is sufficient to determine it. The dynamical law follows
from the application of a principle of inference, the method of maximum entropy
(ME), to the only information available, the initial state and the recognition that
motion occurred. Nothing else. The resulting ‘entropic’ dynamics is very simple:
the system moves continuously and irreversibly along the entropy gradient.
Thus, the honest, correct answer to the inference problem posed by question
Q1 has been given, but the equally important question ‘Will the system in fact
follow the expected trajectory?’ remained unanswered. Whether the actual
trajectory is the expected one depends on whether the information encoded
in the initial state happened to be sufficient for prediction. Indeed, for many
systems, including those for which the dynamics is reversible, more information
is needed.
In section 3 we answer the question:
Q2: Given the initial and the final states, what trajectory is the system ex-
pected to follow?
Again, the question implicitly assumes that there is a trajectory, that in mov-
ing from one state to another the system will pass through a continuous set of
intermediate states. And again, the equation of motion is obtained from a prin-
ciple of inference, the principle of maximum entropy, and not from a principle of
physics. (For a brief account of the ME method in a form that is convenient for
our current purpose see [10].) The resulting ‘entropic’ dynamics also turns out
to be simple: the system moves along a geodesic in the space of states. This is
simple but not trivial: the geometry of the space of states is curved and possibly
quite complicated.
Important features of this entropic dynamics are explored in section 4. We
show that there are some remarkable formal similarities with the theory of
general relativity (GR). For example, just as in GR there is no reference to an
external physical time. The only clock available is provided by the system itself.
It turns out that there is a natural choice for an ‘intrinsic’ or ‘proper’ time. It is a
derived, statistical time defined and measured by the change itself. Intrinsic time
is quantified change. This entropic dynamics can be derived from a Jacobi-type
principle of least action, which we explore both in Lagrangian and Hamiltonian
form. Just as in GR there is invariance under arbitrary reparametrizations – a
form of general covariance – and the entropic dynamics is an example of what
is called a constrained dynamics.
2 Quantifying change: geometry
In this section we briefly review how to quantify the notion of change (for more
details see [6]). The idea is simple: since the larger the change involved in going
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from one state to another, the easier it is to distinguish between them, we claim
that change can be measured by distinguishability. Next, using the ME method
one assigns a probability distribution to each state. This transforms the problem
of distinguishing between two states into the problem of distinguishing between
the corresponding probability distributions. The solution is well-known: the
extent to which one distribution can be distinguished from another is given by
the distance between them as measured by the Fisher-Rao information metric
[11][12][7]. Thus, change is measured by distinguishability which is measured
by distance.
Let the microstates of a physical system be labelled by x, and let m(x)dx
be the number of microstates in the range dx. We assume that a state of the
system (i.e., a macrostate) is defined by the expected values Aα of some nA
appropriately chosen variables aα(x) (α = 1, 2, . . . , nA),
〈aα〉 =
∫
dx p(x)aα(x) = Aα . (1)
A crucial assumption is that the selected variables codify all the information rel-
evant to answering the particular questions in which we happen to be interested.
This is a point that we have made before but must be emphasized again: there is
no systematic procedure to choose the right variables. At present the selection
of relevant variables is made on the basis of intuition guided by experiment; it
is essentially a matter of trial and error. The variables should include those
that can be controlled or observed experimentally, but there are cases where
others must also be included. The success of equilibrium thermodynamics, for
example, derives from the fact that a few variables are sufficient to describe
a static situation, and being few, these variables are easy to identify. In fluid
dynamics, on the other hand, the selection is more dificult. One must include
many more variables, such as the local densities of particles, momentum, and
energy, that are neither controlled nor usually observed.
The states form an nA-dimensional manifold with coordinates given by the
numerical values Aα. To each state we can associate a probability distribution
p(x|A). The distribution that best reflects the prior information contained in
m(x) updated by the information Aα is obtained by maximizing the entropy
S[p : m] = −
∫
dx p(x) log
p(x)
m(x)
. (2)
subject to the constraints (1). The result is
p(x|A) =
1
Z
m(x) e−λαa
α(x), (3)
where the partition function Z and the Lagrange multipliers λα are given by
Z(λ) =
∫
dxm(x) e−λαa
α(x) and −
∂ logZ
∂λα
= Aα . (4)
Next, we argue that the change involved in going from state A to the state
A + dA can be measured by the extent to which the two distributions can be
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distinguished. As discussed in [7], except for an overall multiplicative constant,
the measure of distinguishability we seek is given by the ‘distance’ dℓ between
p(x|A) and p(x|A+ dA),
dℓ2 = gαβ dA
αdAβ , (5)
where
gαβ =
∫
dx p(x|A)
∂ log p(x|A)
∂Aα
∂ log p(x|A)
∂Aβ
(6)
is the Fisher-Rao metric [11][12]. It turns out that this metric is unique: it is
the only Riemannian metric that adequately reflects the fact that the states A
are not ‘structureless points’, but happen to be probability distributions.
To summarize: the very act of assigning a probability distribution p(x|A) to
each state A, automatically provides the space of states with a metric structure.
3 Dynamics and intrinsic time
Given the initial and the final states, what trajectory is the system expected to
follow? The key to answering this question lies in the implicit assumption that
there exists a trajectory or, in other words, that large changes are the result of
a continuous succession of very many small changes. Thus, the difficult problem
of studying large changes is reduced to the much simpler problem of studying
small changes.
Let us therefore focus on small changes and assume that the change in going
from the initial state Ai to the final state Af = Ai +∆A is small enough that
the distance ∆ℓ between them is given by
∆ℓ2 = gαβ ∆A
α∆Aβ . (7)
To find which states are expected to lie on the trajectory between Ai and Af
we reason as follows. In going from the initial to the final state the system must
pass through a halfway point, that is, a state A that is equidistant from Ai
and Af (see fig.1a). The question is which halfway state should we choose? An
answer to this question would clearly determine the trajectory: first find the
halfway point, and use it to determine ‘quarter of the way’ points, and so on.
Next we notice that there is nothing special about halfway states. We could
equally well have argued that in going from the initial to the final state the
system must first traverse a third of the way, that is, it must pass through a
state that is twice as distant from Af as it is from Ai. In general, we can assert
that the system must pass through intermediate states Aω such that, having
already moved a distance dℓ away from the initial Ai, there remains a distance
ωdℓ to be covered to reach the final Af . Halfway states have ω = 1, ‘third of
the way’ states have ω = 2, and so on (see fig.1b).
It appears that each different value of ω provides a different criterion to select
the trajectory. If there is a trajectory and there are several ways to determine
it, consistency demands that all these ways should agree: in the end we must
verify that the selected trajectory is independent of ω or else we have a problem.
Our basic dynamical question Q2 can be rephrased as follows:
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Figure 1: The geometry of dynamics: in going from the initial Ai to the final
state Af the system must pass through states A (dashed line) that are equidis-
tant between them (a), and it must also pass through states Aω (dashed circle)
that are ω times as far from Af as they are from Ai (b).
Q2′ The system is initially in state p(x|Ai) and we are given the new informa-
tion that the system has moved to one of the neighboring states in the
family p(x|Aω). Which p(x|Aω) do we select?
Phrased in this way it is clear that this is precisely the kind of problem to be
tackled using the ME method. Recall [10]: The ME method is a method for
processing information and change our minds. It allows us to go from an old
set of beliefs, described by the prior probability distribution, to a new set of
beliefs, described by the posterior distribution, when the information available
is just a specification of the family of distributions from which the posterior
must be selected [13]. In the more traditional applications of the method this
family of posteriors is constrained or defined by the known expected values of
some relevant variables, but this is not necessary, the constraints need not be
linear functionals. Here the constraints are defined geometrically.
An important question that should arise whenever one contemplates using
the ME method is which entropy should one maximize. Since we want to select
a distribution p(x|A) the entropies to be considered must be of the form
S[p : q] = −
∫
dx p(x|A) log
p(x|A)
q(x)
. (8)
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This is the entropy of p(x|A) relative to the prior q(x). The interpretation of
q(x) as the prior follows from the logic behind the ME method itself. Recall
[10]: In the absence of new information there is no reason to change one’s
mind. When there are no constraints the selected posterior distribution should
coincide with the prior distribution. Since the distribution p that maximizes
S[p : q] subject to no constraints is p ∝ q, we must set q(x) equal to the prior.
Coming back to our dynamical problem, suppose we know that the system
is initially in state p(x|Ai) and we are not given the information that the sys-
tem moved, then we have no reason to suspect that any change has occurred.
Therefore the prior q(x) should be chosen so that the maximization of S[p : q]
subject to no constraints yields the posterior p = p(x|Ai). The correct choice is
q(x) = p(x|Ai).
Now we are ready to tackle the question Q2′: the answer is obtained by
maximizing the entropy
S[A : Ai] = −
∫
dx p(x|A) log
p(x|A)
p(x|Ai)
, (9)
subject to the constraint A = Aω. This presents no problems. It is convenient
to write Aω = Ai + dA and Af = Ai +∆A so that S[Aω : Ai] simplifies to
S[Ai + dA : Ai] = −
1
2
gαβ dA
αdAβ , (10)
and the distances dℓi and dℓf from Aω to Ai and Af are given by
dℓ2i = gαβ dA
αdAβ and dℓ2f = gαβ (∆A
α − dAα)(∆Aβ − dAβ). (11)
Then, to maximize S[Ai + dA : Ai] under variations of dA subject to the con-
straint
ωdℓi = dℓf , (12)
introduce a Lagrange multiplier λ,
δ
(
−
1
2
gαβ dA
αdAβ − λ
(
ω2dℓ2i − dℓ
2
f
))
= 0 . (13)
We get
dAα = χ∆Aα where χ ≡
1
1− ω2 + 1/2λ
. (14)
The multiplier λ, or equivalently the quantity χ, is determined substituting back
into the constraint (12). From eq.(11) we get dℓi = χ∆ℓ and dℓf = (1 − χ)∆ℓ,
and therefore [14]
χ =
1
1 + ω
and λ =
1
2ω(1 + ω)
. (15)
Thus, the intermediate state Aω selected by the maximum entropy method is
such that
dℓi + dℓf = ∆ℓ . (16)
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The geometrical interpretation is obvious: the triangle defined by the points
Ai, Aω, and Af (fig.1) degenerates into a straight line. This is sufficient to
determine a short segment of the trajectory: all intermediate states lie on the
straight line between Ai and Af . The generalization beyond short trajectories
is immediate: if any three nearby points along a curve lie on a straight line the
curve is a geodesic. Note that this result is independent of the value ω so the
potential consistency problem we had identified earlier does not arise.
To summarize, the answer to our question Q2 is simple and elegant:
ED The expected trajectory is the geodesic that passes through the given initial
and final states.
This is the main result of this paper. As promised, in entropic dynamics the
motion is predicted on the basis of a ‘principle of inference’, the principle of
maximum entropy, and not from a ‘principle of physics’.
The dynamics ED was derived in an unusual way and one should expect
some unusual features. Indeed, they become evident as soon as one asks any
question involving time. For example, ED determines the vector tangent to the
trajectory dAα/dℓ, but not the actual ‘velocity’ dAα/dt. The reason is not hard
to find: nowhere in question Q2 nor in any implicit background information is
there any reference to an external time t.
Additional information is required if one is to find a relation between the
distance ℓ along the trajectory and the external time t. In conventional forms of
dynamics this information is implicitly supplied by a ‘principle of physics’, by
a Hamiltonian which fixes the evolution of a system relative to external clocks.
But Q2 makes no mention of any external universe; the only clock available
is the system itself, and our problem becomes one of deciding how this clock
should be read. We could, for example, choose one of the variables Aα, say A1,
as our clock variable and arbitrarily call it intrinsic time. Ultimately it is best
to define intrinsic time so that motion looks simple.
A very natural definition consists in stipulating that the system moves with
unit velocity, then the intrinsic time τ is given by the distance ℓ itself, dτ = dℓ.
Intrinsic time is quantified change. A peculiar consequence of this definition is
that intervals between events along the trajectory are not a priori known, they
are determined only after the equations of motion are solved and the actual
trajectory is determined. This reminds us of the theory of General Relativity
(GR).
An important feature of GR is the absence of references to an external time.
Given initial and final states, in this case the initial and final three-dimensional
geometries of space, the proper time interval along any curve between them
is only determined after solving the Einstein equations of motion [15]. The
absence of an external time has been a serious impediment in understanding
the classical theory [16] – because it is not clear which variables represent the
true gravitational degrees of freedom – and also in formulating a quantum theory
[17] – because of difficulties in defining equal-time commutators.
In the following section we rewrite the entropic dynamics in Lagrangian and
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Hamiltonian forms and we point out some further formal similarities between
ED and GR.
4 Formal developments
The entropic dynamics can be derived from an ‘action’ principle. Since the
trajectory is a geodesic, the ‘action’ is the length itself,
J [A] =
∫ ηf
ηi
dη L(A, A˙), (17)
where η is an arbitrary parameter along the trajectory, the Lagrangian is
L(A, A˙) =
(
gαβA˙
αA˙β
)1/2
and A˙α =
dAα
dη
. (18)
The action J [A] is invariant under reparametrizations A(η)→ A(f(η)) pro-
vided the end points are left unchanged, f(ηi) = ηi and f(ηf ) = ηf . Indeed,
when the transformation is infinitesimal, f(η) = η + ε(η), the corresponding
change in the action,
δJ =
(
gαβA˙
αA˙β
)1/2
ε(η)
∣∣∣∣
ηf
ηi
, (19)
vanishes provided ε(ηi) = ε(ηf ) = 0. As pointed out in [18] there is an important
distinction between the symmetries of a generally covariant theory such as GR
and the internal symmetries of a proper gauge theory. The action of a generally
covariant theory is invariant under those reparametrizations that are restricted
to map the boundary onto itself; for proper internal gauge transformations
there are no such restrictions. Thus ED shares with GR the fact that both are
generally covariant theories.
It is instructive to consider the analogous principle of least action for a
nonrelativistic particle. The standard Hamilton’s principle requires extremizing
the action ∫ tf
ti
dt
(
m
2
δab
dxa
dt
dxb
dt
− V (x)
)
, (20)
where t is ‘physical’ time, and the interval between initial and final states tf − ti
is given. In contrast, Jacobi’s principle of least action for a particle with energy
E moving in a potential V (x) determines the trajectory by extremizing the
action
J [x] =
∫ ηf
ηi
dη
(
2mδab
dxa
dη
dxb
dη
)1/2
(E − V (x))1/2 . (21)
There is no reference to any time t, the time interval between initial and fi-
nal states is not given, and the parameter η is unphysical and arbitrary. To
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determine the temporal evolution along the trajectory requires an additional
supplementary condition,
m
2
δab
dxa
dt
dxb
dt
+ V (x) = E . (22)
Thus the ED action, eq.(17), is an action of the Jacobi type. The natural choice
for a supplementary condition that defines τ and determines the evolution along
the trajectory is
gαβ
dAα
dτ
dAβ
dτ
= 1 . (23)
It is interesting that GR is also described by a Jacobi-type action [19]. To
explore this similarity further it is convenient to construct the canonical (i.e.,
Hamiltonian as opposed to Lagrangian) version of Jacobi’s action.
The canonical momenta are given by
πα =
∂L
∂A˙α
=
gαβA˙
β
(
gµνA˙µA˙ν
)1/2 (24)
and have unit magnitude,
gαβπαπβ = 1 . (25)
The canonical Hamiltonian vanishes identically,
Hcan(A, π) = A˙
απα − L(A, A˙) ≡ 0 , (26)
because the Lagrangian is homogeneous of first degree in the A˙’s. Physically
this is not surprising: the generator of time evolution can be expected to vanish
whenever there is no external time with respect to which the system could
possibly evolve. We are led to consider the canonical action
∫ ηf
ηi
dη
(
A˙απα −Hcan
)
=
∫ ηf
ηi
dη A˙απα , (27)
but eq.(25) implies that unconstrained variations of the momenta πα are not
allowed. The correct variational principle requires to extremize the action
I[A, π,N ] =
∫ ηf
ηi
dη
[
A˙απα −N h(A, π)
]
(28)
where
h(A, π) =
1
2
gαβπαπβ −
1
2
(29)
and N(η) are Lagrange multipliers that enforce the constraint
h(A, π) = 0 . (30)
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for each value of η. The overall factor of 1/2 in eq.(29) is introduced for later
convenience; it amounts to rescaling N . Variation of I[A, π,N ] with respect to
A, π, and N yields the equations of motion,
π˙α = −N
∂h
∂Aα
, A˙α = N
∂h
∂πα
, (31)
and eq.(30). Naturally there is no equation of motion for N and it must be
determined from the constraint. We obtain,
N =
(
gαβA˙
αA˙β
)1/2
, (32)
which, using the supplementary condition eq.(23), implies
dτ = N dη . (33)
The analogue of N in GR is called the lapse function, it gives the increase of
‘intrinsic’ time per unit increase of the unphysical parameter η. In terms of τ
the equations of motion become
dπα
dτ
= −
∂h
∂Aα
and
dAα
dτ
=
∂h
∂πα
. (34)
In reparametrization invariant or generally covariant theories there is no canon-
ical Hamiltonian (it vanishes identically) but there are constraints. It is the
constraints that play the role of generators of evolution, of change. Accord-
ingly, the analogue of eq.(30) in GR is called the Hamiltonian constraint.
5 Final remarks
I have provided an answer to the question ‘Given the initial and final states,
what is the trajectory followed by the system?’ The answer follows from estab-
lished principles of inference without invoking additional ‘physical’ postulates.
The entropic dynamics thus derived turns out to be formally similar to other
generally covariant theories: the dynamics is reversible; the trajectories are
geodesics; the system supplies its own notion of an intrinsic time; the motion
can be derived from a variational principle that turns out to be of the form of
Jacobi’s action principle rather than the more familiar principle of Hamilton;
and the canonical Hamiltonian formulation is an example of a dynamics driven
by constraints.
To conclude one should point out that a reasonable physical theory must
satisfy two key requirements: the first is that it must provide us with a set of
mathematical models, the second is that the theory must identify real physical
systems to which the models might possibly apply. The entropic dynamics we
propose in this paper satisfies the first requirement, but so far it fails with respect
to the second; it may be a reasonable theory but it is not yet ‘physical’. There
are formal similarities with the general theory of relativity and one wonders: Is
11
this a coincidence? Whether GR will in the end turn out to be an example of
ED is at this point no more than a speculation. A more definite answer hinges
on the still unsettled problem of identifying those variables that describe the
true degrees of freedom of the gravitational field [16][17].
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